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Abstract
Most debate on home ownership and risk has focused on the management of mortgage
debt. But there are other risks for home buyers in settings where housing dominates people’s
wealth portfolios: where the investment dimensions of property are at a premium; and where
housing wealth is, de facto, an asset base for welfare. This article draws from qualitative research
with 150 UK mortgage holders to assess the character, extent and possible mitigation of this
wider risk regime. The analysis first explores the value home buyers attach to the financial
returns on housing. Next we document the extent to which home equity is earmarked and
used as a financial buffer. Finally, reflecting on the merits and limitations of this tactic, we
conclude by asking whether – in the interests of housing and social policy, as well as with a view
to managing the economy – there is any need, scope or appetite for more actively sharing the
financial risks and investment gains of housing systems anchored on owner-occupation.
Introduction
Most debate around home ownership and risk has focused on mortgage debt:
on the borrowings required to climb the housing ladder; on the predictors of
mortgage default; and on the payment protection ‘gap’ that arises where private
insurances replace state safety nets for borrowers in arrears. Some parts of the
protection gap are more readily bridged than others – loss of employment is
insurable, relationship breakdown is not – but there is little doubt that mortgagors
are more vulnerable to structural shifts and biographical disruption now than
they were ten years ago (Ford et al., 2001, 2004; Smith et al., 2004). Although the
risks of unsustainable debt cluster at the margins of home ownership, they merit
ongoing attention because these margins are so wide. The mantra that owner-
occupation contains the majority of the rich but more than half the poor may be
well-worn (Burrows and Wilcox, 2000), but it underlines the fact that mortgage
default can be widespread, especially in markets supported by subprime or non-
conforming loans (Langley, 2007; Munro et al., 2005; Pannell, 2006). The short
step from default to bankruptcy, possession and abandonment is all too evident
in the wake of the recent credit ‘crunch’.
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While the credit risks associated with home ownership are well documented,
surprisingly little attention has been paid to the equity side of the housing
equation: to the risks home buyers face in settings where housing demands a high
proportion of personal wealth, requires a property-biased investment portfolio,
and links households’ welfare disproportionately to the financial rewards, or
investment returns, of owner-occupation. The individual and systemic risks of
creating ‘home-ownership’ societies like the UK – where the dominant housing
tenure is not only highly leveraged but coupled with an inflexible investment
vehicle (the performance of a single property), itself positioned as an asset
base for welfare – are rarely aired. The options for managing these risks are
correspondingly under-explored.
This article draws from qualitative research with a cross-section of
mortgagors in England to show why this second type of housing risk – over-
investment into a single asset, over-dependence on housing wealth, and
vulnerability to the under-performance of housing assets – merits attention
from the perspective of social (as well as economic) policy, and to consider how
it might best be mitigated. The UK provides an apposite case study because it
epitomises a growing number of societies whose economic and welfare regimes
revolve around the wealth contained in housing. Such contexts are shaped by an
‘ethopolitics’ (a style of governance) that prioritises home ownership (Flint, 2003;
Smith, 2008), a sustained if volatile history of house price appreciation which
has turned housing into a major store of wealth for the majority of households
(Smith, 2006), and a programme of financial deregulation that, over a twenty-
year period, loosened credit constraints and made housing wealth more fungible
(more accessible or spendable) than ever before (Muellbauer, 2006).
The data resources for this article are outlined next; the remainder of the
discussion falls into four short sections. The first provides a lay perspective on the
growing concentration of wealth into owned housing. The second documents
the extent to which borrowers plan for and deploy these assets as a safeguard
against financial (and other) uncertainty. Third, we show why this is a risky
tactic, drawing attention to the limitations as well as the benefits of ‘banking on
housing’. Finally, we turn to the question of whether households, communities
or whole societies have any need, scope or appetite to mitigate the investment as
well as credit risks associated with home ownership.
The study
This article is based on the experiences of 150 home buyers interviewed as
part of the ESRC/AHRC-funded project ‘Banking on housing; spending the
home’: a mixed methods study of the implications of housing wealth for
consumption. In addition to a round-up of quantitative evidence (Smith and
Searle, 2008), new qualitative data were collected in two phases, spanning
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18 months to the peak of the current housing cycle in June 2006 (see Smith et al.,
2007a).
Phase I comprises 150 interviews, completed by telephone, with a cross-
section of mortgagors selected purposively from two extensive surveys: 100
households were recruited from a study of mortgage payment safety nets, itself
based on a random sample of mortgagors from the Survey of English Housing
(Ford et al., 2004); a further 50 participants were selected from the quasi-random
CML/ODPM Survey of Flexible Mortgages (Smith et al., 2002). Interviews were
completed with a mix of first-time (27 per cent) and established buyers, holding a
range of flexible1 (57 per cent) and more traditional mortgages. Participants also
span income and home-equity tertiles, and evince a gender balance. Thirty-five
participants – a spread of borrowers from a range of neighbourhood types – also
hosted home visits during phase II of the research.
Both sweeps entailed wide-ranging qualitative discussions, guided by
a checklist, recorded with participants’ consent, transcribed, anonymised,
agreed with each interviewee and coded for computer-assisted retrieval. Whole
transcripts are also preserved, so that individual narratives as well as general coded
trends can be drawn into the analysis. In this article, the number of participants
who subscribe to particular views or describe particular experiences is given
(where appropriate), to map the shape of the data.2 Additionally, participants’
own words are used to exemplify particular points, and to illustrate the motives
and aspirations underpinning households’ financial behaviours. Quotations have
been selected to reflect the breadth and depth, but not necessarily frequency, of
key themes.3
Banking on housing
Whatever else I had done with the same amount of money, I would never have made the same
return on my investment. [‘Housing investor’ whose home has tripled in value over 20 years]
Whether by accident or design, housing is the single most important component
of personal wealth for the majority of ‘Banking on housing’ (Boh) mortgagors
(98/150), as it is for their counterparts in most other countries (Muellbauer,
2006), especially in the English-speaking world (Smith, 2006). To consider the
implications of this, Boh participants were grouped according to where these
home assets fit into a wider wealth portfolio. Just under half (72/150) are ‘housing
investors’; they conform to the British norm of holding their financial ‘eggs’
primarily in an owned housing ‘basket’, and they are conscious of its role in their
financial affairs. There is a smaller group of ‘general-investors’ (n = 34) whose
wealth portfolios are deliberately more diverse. The remainder, the ‘homebodies’
(n = 44), may (or may not) in practice concentrate their wealth into housing (26
of them do), but none explicitly attaches financial value to the meaning of their
home.
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TABLE 1. Why people did not spend less on housing and invest more elsewhere
Reason % (/110)
1. The idea never figured 24
‘I couldn’t think of anything much else to invest the money in.’ [Male, 36,
low-income homebody, first-time buyer]
2. Not affordable in combination with home purchase 28
‘to get a house in this area, I had to commit all the capital I had and have
the maximum mortgage I could get.’ [Female, 47, high-income general
investor]
3. Not desirable, because housing: 48
(a) is a comparatively safe investment
‘given the pensions market at the moment, I think I’d have been better off
putting the money on number 9 red at Las Vegas.’ [Male, 42, high income
housing investor];
‘housing is much more secure, the stock market is too volatile.’ [Female,
50, medium-income housing investor];
(b) is more legible than the alternatives
‘I’ve never understood the stock market and pensions baffle me.’ [Female,
39, low-income housing investor]
(c) brings better returns
‘stocks and shares aren’t worth a carrot . . . [but] you can’t really go too far
wrong with property.’ [Male, 49, low-income housing investor, first-time
buyer]
All three groups were asked whether they had considered spending less on
housing and investing more elsewhere. The majority had not (n = 110); they offer
three reasons why (Table 1). One in four – mainly homebodies – say it simply
never occurred to them: their comments illustrate the extent to which investing
into owned homes has become ‘normalised’ for UK households (see also Smith,
2008). A larger group, almost one in three – investors and homebodies alike –
point out that home purchase is costly: it demands a high proportion, if not all,
their financial resources whether they want it to or not. But by far the commonest
reason for prioritising housing over other investments – forwarded notably, but
not uniquely, by housing investors – is the belief that owned homes not only
produce the best housing services, but constitute the most logical, legible and
reliable style of wealth-holding there is.
That nearly half favour housing over other investments is not surprising,
because housing has generally performed well: since 1971, the UK has, with Spain,
topped the OECD league table for annual house-price appreciation (Catte et al.,
2004); and by 2007 the nation owned more than £2.5 trillion of unmortgaged
housing equity. Notwithstanding its uneven distribution, and even in the context
of volatile prices, housing is now the most widely dispersed class of assets, and the
only significant wealth-holding, among the majority of British households. There
is, as might be expected, a ‘feel-good’ factor attached to this, though (as we shall
see) even before the current uncertainties it was not the unfettered exuberance
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TABLE 2. Why people value home assets
Valued element % (/94)
Magnitude of price gain 23
‘It’s basically doubled in price in six years.’ [Female, 39]
An asset to sell 32
‘If we are in trouble, we could always sell . . . we are in a good area and
could sell quickly . . . it’s reassuring.’ [Female, 30, first-time buyer]
A resource to tap into 20
‘it’s more valuable than other assets because the banks will take it as
security for other financial things.’ [Male, 51]
Other∗ 25
Note:∗ ‘Other’ mainly refers to the comments of ‘homebodies’; those who do not
value housing for its financial worth.
that some commentators presume. A more striking finding in Boh is the extent to
which housing wealth is celebrated as a ‘feel-safe’ resource. Portrayed as a shield,
comfort zone, blanket, buffer or tool, it is hard to overstate the sense of security
conferred on study participants by the possession of home assets. Particularly for
established middle-aged owners – like this low-income woman, whose current
loan-to-value is just 20 per cent – it is difficult to overrate ‘the comfort of knowing
that you’ve got something that you can fall back on’. But even among those with
significant mortgage debt and relatively little housing wealth, the general view is
that: ‘should the unthinkable happen, there is that safety net available’; ‘whatever
happens, I know I am going to be OK’.
In short, for those who own any housing wealth at all, its role as a guarantor
of financial security has moved to centre stage. This point is underlined in Table 2
where nearly two-thirds (n = 94) elaborate on what they most value about
holding housing wealth. There is, perhaps predictably, reference to the ‘windfall’
effect that flows from price gains alone. But this is not the dominant theme; only
two general-investors mention it at all. Instead, over half those whose views are
captured in the table locate their sense of financial security in two less well-aired
attributes of home equity: its liquidity (the option to sell up or trade down to
release wealth) and its utility (as collateral to borrow against).
Home buyers have a lot riding on the thought that their housing wealth can
readily be sold or cashed in. Among housing investors and homebodies, this tactic
is generally seen as a last resort; though for general-investors it can equally be a
lifestyle option. Either way, for one in three of those whose views are represented in
Table 2, owned housing is experienced as a financial buffer because it is a saleable
commodity. A smaller cluster of study participants, especially housing or general-
investors, also value their housing wealth as collateral – they prize it as a resource
that can be borrowed against if the going gets tough. The following quotations
reflect the way this aspect of the fungibility of housing wealth is recognised,
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respectively, across the low, medium and high socio-economic groupings in the
study:
I’ve been able to remortgage it: it’s got me through a divorce . . . it is there for my children.
[Female, 39]
I value the fact that, if needs be, I can borrow more against it. [Female, 28, first-time buyer]
Once they brought in flexible mortgages, where it made it very easy to turn that tap on, that
[the role of housing wealth as a safety net] was definitely the case. [Male, 49]
These study participants are all referring to the practice of mortgage equity
withdrawal (MEW) – a method of borrowing against housing to fund other
things, whose changing style and growing popularity mark a sea-change in how
home equity works (Smith and Searle, 2008). Years of financial de-regulation,
growing competition among lenders, and a frenzy of product innovation in the
early 2000s, explain why Boh mortgagors found it almost as easy, and nearly as
routine, to roll equity out of housing as to pay off their loan. Housing wealth
has entered day-to-day decisions around savings, spending and debt, smoothing
over dips in income, supporting increased expenditures and helping tackle a
suite of unexpected life events. In the period of this study, home assets were
better positioned than ever before to provide a financial buffer; and borrowers
came increasingly to depend on owned homes for this function.
The concentration of assets into housing is a hot topic among economists
concerned with monetary policy and macro-economic stability (Muellbauer,
2006). Likewise, the growing fungibility of home equity drives economic accounts
of the way wealth (and debt) portfolios operate (Banks et al., 2004; Bridges et al.,
2006). Setting lay perspectives alongside quantitative indicators, our findings
hint that housing wealth equally has a welfare dimension. This idea is not new,
especially in relation to housing costs in older age and the changing role of
inheritance (Lowe, 1990, 1992). But homebuyers in the early 2000s had more
wealth in property than ever before, and exercised more options to spend from it
then than they are likely see again. This enabled Boh participants to locate their
sense of social and financial security – qualities once rooted in the institutions
of the welfare state – in the possession of an increasingly spendable store of
housing wealth. Home equity has acquired an ‘insurance’, as well as ‘investment’,
dimension, and this is as much a challenge for social policy as a matter for
economic management.
From housing wealth to welfare?
I’d be scuppered if I had a major expenditure to fund without drawing on the mortgage. [Low
income, female, aged 50, whose mortgage has tripled in the last eight years]
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Economic indicators testify to the growing importance, in practice as well as in
theory, of home assets for the consumption of goods, services and experiences of
all kinds. There is a steady (though by no means straightforward) flow of wealth
from housing into the wider economy (Case et al., 2005). This is corroborated
by social research which identifies a shift (albeit uneven) away from the idea that
housing wealth is primarily a legacy for future generations towards the notion
that it is a resource to spend across the life course (Rowlingson and McKay, 2005;
J. Smith, 2004; S. J. Smith, 2008). In line with other studies, just two in five Boh
participants expect to leave their housing wealth for inheritance; most plan to
spend some (36 per cent) or all (20 per cent) of it before they die, either on high
days and holidays, or to meet a more sobering array of welfare needs.
While it is likely that these needs, and the role of housing wealth in meeting
them, vary across the life course, it is hard to establish precisely when, where and
to what ends housing wealth is actually deployed. The major UK surveys, if they
ask the relevant questions, use very broad response categories, none of which
taps into welfare or subsistence spending (Smith and Searle, 2008). Benito (2007)
has, nevertheless, used data from the BHPS (British Household Panel Survey) to
show that spending from MEW across a decade to 2003 is consistent with models
predicting its use as a financial buffer. And the finer-grained approach in Boh
shows that nearly half those phase I interviewees who rolled any money out of
housing at all (45/94) channelled at least some of their spend towards financial
services and welfare management. This includes providing funds for children
(and parents) of all ages, consolidating debts, planning for the future, or using
MEW as an income-smoothing mechanism.
At the same time, five of the 35 phase II participants – one in seven – had
resorted substantially to the welfare role of home assets, allocating 10 per cent or
more of their spend from MEW to ‘safety net’ items. This ranged from the 10 per
cent set aside by this low-income borrower (whose loan-to-value now stands at
90 per cent) – ‘to give me a buffer’ which is gradually ‘whittled away’ – to the 30
per cent drawn down by high income households ‘as a way of covering our backs’,
and the 50 per cent absorbed ‘just surviving’ by those who are income poor but
who – as in this case – have a medium store of unmortgaged home equity to draw
from, by way of a loan they can just about service. This, moreover, is only the tip
of the ‘self insurance’ iceberg buoyed up by a sea of housing wealth.
Nearly a decade ago the government announced that benefit assistance
with mortgage arrears would be of a type ‘encouraging home owners to make
increased provision for unforeseen circumstances, reducing the burden on the
state and rewarding responsible behaviour’ (DETR, 2000: 39). The idea was that
private insurance would step in where state support bowed out. But mirroring
wider trends, less than half the case study households have an income-support
or payment-protection policy: they are (as we shall see) markedly insurance
averse. Instead, the majority (27/35) expect to bridge payment gaps by combining
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the buffer function of housing equity with creative mortgage management,
positioning home equity as the preferable, reliable, cost effective route to self-
insurance:
I: Do you think reserving some of the equity in your home would be as safe as an insurance
policy?
R: Safer, probably . . . The performance of insurance policies hasn’t been brilliant. [Male, 51
medium-income, high-equity]
Drawing from housing wealth may well be a last resort: ‘a last ditch thing to save
the home’ even among higher-income groups where loans-to-values are high –
in this case nearly 90 per cent. But the presumption in the data is that it is
nevertheless a resource that could be, and often is, deployed when necessary to
manage uncertainty. Nearly half bought into owned housing precisely for this
kind of security; and as many as two thirds of these case study interviews (25/35)
contain the view that people − even middle-income people − should set some
housing wealth aside, because: ‘you don’t know what’s going to happen in life’.
In sum, the case study interviews suggest that while owner-occupation is popular
for all kinds of reasons, it has come to occupy prime position in households’
thinking about how to manage financial and other risks.
There is a growing debate, within and outside government, on the merits
and limitations of asset-based welfare. While this often hinges around affordable
credit and incentivised savings, harnessing housing wealth is clearly in the frame
(Maxwell and Sodha, 2006). For example, the UK government’s drive to expand
owner-occupation (culminating in the idea of HomeBuy) makes it clear that
owned homes ‘are not just places to live’, but rather tools ‘enabling people to
share in increasing asset wealth’ (ODPM, 2005: 10). Debatable though this might
be in theory, in practice the die is cast. The data in Boh indicate that, irrespective of
acts of governance, borrowers already look to housing wealth to manage financial
risks and meet welfare needs. By virtue of its monetary worth tomorrow and its
spendability today, housing is, de facto, an asset base for welfare.
Managing a risky business?
There’s so many things that can affect the state of the housing market but that are completely
out of your control. [Female, 39, first-time buyer]
The strategies of ‘banking on housing’ and ‘spending the home’ documented so
far testify to the centrality of home assets in households’ wealth portfolios and to
the role of housing wealth in meeting welfare needs. This role is enhanced both
by the newfound fungibility of housing wealth, and by changes in the governance
of welfare which increase individuals’ reliance on their personal wealth-holdings.
But while house prices generally perform well (at least in the long term), when
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viewed as a financial strategy, having so much wealth concentrated into housing
amounts to a narrow, and therefore risky, investment portfolio. This is potentially
problematic for borrowers wherever MEW is in vogue: any spend from housing
wealth increases their dependence on home values, and underlines their exposure
to house price, as well as credit, risks. However, the more central housing assets
are as a welfare resource – the more people rely on such wealth for basic household
needs – the more risky this tactic is for whole societies as well as for the individuals
within them. Exposing owner-occupiers so systematically to the fortunes not just
of a single class of assets (which, from a financial point of view is risky enough),
but of one component of this – their owned home – is as questionable as excluding
renters from the sector at all, and as challenging for the practicalities of social
policy as it is for theories of financial management.
It is generally assumed that home owners are unaware of housing market
risks: that they arrived at this position through their own ‘irrational exuberance’
(Shiller, 2005), irrespective of financial logic or active governance. But in fact,
almost four in five (119/150) Boh participants temper the ‘feel-good’ element
of their accumulating housing wealth with a much more cautionary tale. In
response to a cluster of prompts about past, present and future price dynamics,
home buyers express four main concerns, showing awareness (in Table 3) of a
suite of systemic as well as individual risks, which some policy documents now
acknowledge (Stephens et al., 2005).
As well as flagging (in rows one and four), the destabilising effects of
declining affordability, and a range of credit risks, mortgagors recognise two
other questionable assumptions of their dependence on housing wealth: price
and liquidity risk. Row two taps into a cluster of concerns around price risk.
‘Banking on housing’ is a tactic that depends on home values appreciating steadily,
thus replenishing stocks of equity over time so that owned homes retain their
credibility as security for MEW. But as recent trends indicate, house prices are
volatile, in the short and long run (see also Banks et al., 2004; Catte et al., 2004).
Whether they constitute speculative bubbles by analogy with stock markets,
or simply adjust around fundamentals, their downside can be problematic.
Furthermore, placing the majority of financial eggs into a single housing basket
presumes property will, on average, perform at least as well as other investments.
This may be a fair assumption given the tax breaks on accumulating wealth
through home ownership, but study participants themselves recognise that it is
never true for every individual home. Even in buoyant markets, there are snakes
as well as ladders (Hamnett, 1999; Henley, 1999), and the wealth gains from
housing are spatially uneven and socio-economically unequal (Dorling et al.,
2007; Thomas and Dorling, 2004). Finally (row three), some Boh participants
also recognise that housing markets are not always sufficiently liquid to allow
people to release funds by the popular method of trading down. As prices peak,
and equally, in the face of economic dips or shocks, prices are sticky, and housing
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TABLE 3. The risks of ‘banking on housing’
Type of risk n % (/119)
Any (including multiple) concerns about market risk 119 100
1. Risks associated with exclusion 45 38
‘I just feel sad for our youngsters.’ [Male, 48, medium-income
housing investor]
‘It’s very difficult for us to recruit essential workers.’ [Male, 64,
low-income homebody]
‘If the first time buyers fall out, then a lot of the market falls out.’
[Female, 42, low-income housing investor]
2. Price risk 43 36
‘Although things have gone up, they could go down.’ [Female, 50,
low-income homebody, first-time buyer]
‘If you have all your eggs in one basket, then the downside is bigger
as well.’ [Female, 55, high-income housing investor]
‘It’s great that we’ve made all this money . . . in reality other areas
have made more.’ [Female, 28, middle-income housing investor,
first-time buyer]
3. Liquidity risk 25 21
‘You used to get people moving to upgrade . . . [but now] I can see
a static market, which isn’t good.’ [Male, 43, middle-income
housing investor]
‘The doubt would be about selling it quickly . . .’ [Male, 43, high-
income general investor]
‘As prices rise, I feel more and more trapped.’ [Female, 47,
middle-income housing investor, first-time buyer]
4. Interest rate/other repayment risk 17 14
‘I don’t think people realise that if [interest rates] did take [go up by]
2 or 3 per cent, how much trouble people are going to be in.’
[Male, 36, middle-income general investor]
markets slow (Case and Quigley, 2008). So this style of equity withdrawal might
be least available when it is most required.
It is not surprising that those homebuyers who are sensitive to housing
investment risks seek to minimise them. ‘General-investors’, for example, give two
key reasons for holding assets other than housing: spreading risks and maximising
liquidity. At the same time, ‘housing investors’ who may have arrived at their
current position more by accident than design, and who may have capitalised
on this good fortune by borrowing against price gains, nevertheless note that:
‘If I’d pots of money, I wouldn’t have all my eggs in one basket’; ‘over time,
we’ll diversify’. Diversification is, of course, a common tactic among investors:
it is the foundational element of portfolio building; it brings better (and safer)
returns than investments anchored on housing alone (Di et al., 2003). But it is
not an option that many households have. As things stand, in order to buy the
housing services they need, home buyers have also to purchase, in its entirely,
an investment vehicle which is tied to the fortunes of a single property. Some
borrowers may use MEW to rebalance that portfolio, borrowing against homes
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to invest in other things (Schwartz et al., 2006), but this is expensive, involving a
loan which has to be serviced. There is in theory a more cost-effective solution,
which is able to address both the over-dependence of home owners on house
price appreciation, and the exclusion of renters from any investment return on
housing at all. However, the financial tools required – the secondary markets and
risk-sharing instruments which are currently in place for almost every other class
of asset – have only recently become available for housing.
Hedging housing risk
This thing where the value of house bounces up and down doesn’t make for a secure, safe
nation. [Female, late 50s, low income, little housing equity]
It is generally agreed that some kind of risk-sharing is necessary to stabilise
housing markets and protect their occupants. An alliance of home buyers, lenders
and government is, for example, at the heart of SHOP – the safe home-ownership
partnership proposed by Ford and Wilcox (2005) to manage the (credit) risks of
mortgage arrears and possession. Shared appreciation mortgages, equity share
schemes and numerous other alliances designed to lever people into home
ownership are also risk-sharing enterprises. But so far the options for spreading
housing investment (price) risks have been limited,4 and all financial risk-sharing
in property has been based on relatively unsophisticated financial instruments.
Most schemes have therefore been less cost-effective, less inclusive, less appealing
to a range of risk-sharing ‘partners’, and less interesting for social policy, than
they could be.
This contrasts with the generally accepted style of risk-sharing for the
performance of commodities, equities, bonds and a host of other assets, which
stems from the trade in derivatives that is managed by financial markets. In
the past year, the idea of using derivatives to manage the housing economy
has proved controversial, following the collapse of the market for mortgage-
backed securities and the failure of complex credit derivatives to protect over-
exposed investors. This is a problem rooted in poorly managed, and inadequately
regulated, attempts to address the debt side of the housing equation by turning
unpaid (perhaps unpayable) loans into quasi-assets. The wider economic crisis
this has precipitated is too large (and too recent) a subject to embrace here.
However, this paper is concerned with the equity side of housing, and if anything,
the turmoil of 2008 adds to, rather than detracts from, the case for using housing
(equity) instruments for risk mitigation (Belsky et al., 2008; Smith, 2009a). It is
therefore worth considering the relevance of financial instruments (contracts),
whose values derive from the price of an underlying asset (or index), but which
can be traded independently of that asset (because they effectively detach the
investment dimensions of the asset from its ownership and use). Such instruments
provide a means of transferring or managing market risk and they are routinely
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used by large institutions both to protect (hedge) positions that are over-exposed
to particular prices, and to buy into the performance of assets which they do
not physically hold. Since the value of such contracts (in the from of options,
futures, forwards and swaps) can be many times greater than the global GDP. So
it is surprising that barely any of this is anchored on housing, which is still the
world’s most valuable commodity.
Housing derivatives potentially enable actors to buy or sell the performance
of a ‘basket’ of properties (usually in the form of a house-price index),
irrespective of their ownership (or not) of the homes comprising this. Using
these instruments, home buyers (as well as landlords, lenders and property
developers) can sell some of their investment risk in return for lower housing
outlays today or a guaranteed sale price tomorrow. At the same time, actors
who are otherwise excluded from, or averse to, holding residential property
(renters or their agents, insurers, pension funds, hedge funds and banks) can
buy into price appreciation. The economic case for developing such instruments
is persuasive (see Case et al., 1993; Englund et al., 2002; Iacoviello and Ortalo-
Magné, 2002; Quigley, 2006; as well as the essays collected in Smith and Searle,
2009), and although derivatives generally tend to inhabit a financial world that is
inaccessible to ordinary people (and often detrimental to their fiscal wellbeing),
the economic imaginary inspiring housing derivatives has always been biased
towards the small investor and linked to social ends. Caplin et al. (2003a), for
example, dub housing derivatives ‘the human face of capitalism’ because they
can potentially extend the benefits of modern financial instruments beyond large
institutions and into the homes of ordinary households. Likewise, Quigley (2005)
cites housing derivatives as the answer to his own rhetorical question of ‘how
to improve the welfare of European housing consumers at practically no cost’.
In short, derivatives draw housing into what Robert Shiller calls a new financial
order by harnessing ‘a radically new risk management infrastructure to preserve
the billions of minor – and not so minor – economic gains that sustain people
around the world’ (2003: ix).
Whether housing derivatives will be used to these ends depends on several
things. Firstly, there is the question of whether markets of any kind can or should
be used to achieve social policy goals. This debate is foregrounded for housing by
the credit crisis of 2007−08. Its outcome depends partly on whether markets can
be sufficiently regulated and revised to accommodate an ethic of care; and it may
be that they can (see Smith, 2005). Secondly, it depends on the fledgling market
for housing derivatives gaining traction – an outcome which seems likely because
the financial logic is so strong (Labuszewski, 2006; Ratcliffe, 2006), but which
is not inevitable. Finally, it depends on a suite of ‘retail’ issues: how derivatives
are packaged for housing institutions; whether policy makers, practitioners or
households have an appetite for the result; and whether governments are able,
willing and sufficiently imaginative to wrest social policy gains from financial
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TABLE 4. Spreading the risks of having too many financial eggs in a single
housing basket
Proportion of case study participants who would consider this product % (/35)
House price index-linked savings account 74
‘investing in property without investing in property . . . I can see the
benefits of getting the property increases without risking your capital.’
[Female, 36, high-income general investor]
An index of London house prices 60
‘If you lived in Salford, I can see that would be a blinding idea.’ [Male, 40,
middle-income general investor]
Home equity insurance 29
‘If it were affordable it would be a good tool as it would absolutely secure
the future value of your property.’ [Male, 51, high-income housing
investor]
‘Spread-betting’ on house prices 11
‘Everything we do with house prices is a form of gambling.’ [Female, 47,
low-income housing investor, first-time buyer]
market innovations (Smith, 2009b). From a social policy perspective, however,
a key question is the suitability, appeal and safety of derivatives-based solutions
for home-occupiers.
To consider this, participants in the case study phase of Boh (n = 35) were
invited to comment on four different ways of balancing the ups and downs of their
own home values with house price-indexed products (see Table 4). Obviously,
this is a small group and their views – elicited at the peak of the current housing
cycle – are indicative rather than definitive, but they are worth noting because
there are so few consumer views recorded in the growing literature on this
theme.
The most widespread public face of housing derivatives takes the form of
house price-linked savings accounts or bonds. More than 20 such products were
launched in the UK in 2005 (Ratcliffe, 2006). They provide consumers with a
reasonably safe means of spreading housing investment risks (and gains) across
a basket of prices, since they offer the upside of price appreciation with no risk
of capital loss. For renters, moreover, they are a way of buying into house prices
without incurring any other costs of ownership. As yet these savings vehicles lack
the leverage or tax breaks of owner-occupation itself, but with a little political
imagination they could provide a stepping-stone into home purchase, allowing
buyers to delay entry to the market without the risk of being priced out over time.
If based on a regional house price index, moreover, price-linked savings could
assist labour mobility, allowing people to move between regions without being
locked out by widening price differentials.
There is considerable enthusiasm for house price-linked savings vehicles
among the mortgagors in the study: three in every four are attracted to the
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idea. Part of the appeal is a straight comparison between bank interest rates and
house-price appreciation at the height of the housing cycle. But this is not the
whole story: people who engage with the idea that returns on savings could be
linked to a price index, rather than to interest rates, also appreciate the following
qualities:
Legibility
You can’t see what a portfolio is. It’s just a portfolio. Whereas with house prices, you hear more
about them. [Female, 36, middle-income housing investor, first-time buyer]
Manageability
an additional way to balance investment in property without necessarily actually investing in
new property ownership . . . you don’t have something else to manage and run. [Male, 51,
high-income housing investor]
Safety
the worst that could happen would be that the interest rates would go down, and that’s not the
same as investing yourself in houses where the equity might go down. [Female, 47, low-income
housing investor, first-time buyer]
Flexibility
If I could get out of the agreement quite quickly, then I would ride that wave for a while. [Male, 39,
middle-income homebody, first-time buyer]
So there may be an appetite among home buyers, especially first time buyers
and those with most of their wealth in their homes, for products designed to
help diversify housing investments. Study participants were also asked whether
they would buy products designed to help hedge their housing risks, to protect
them against falling prices or slower-than-expected growth. Derivatives make
this kind of protection feasible for the first time: it has never been possible to
hedge housing risks in the past. The obvious way to package this is as a form
of insurance: an idea which has already been applied in the USA, building from
the theory in Shiller and Weiss (1994) to the practicalities of the Syracuse home
equity protection scheme (Caplin et al., 2003b). By guaranteeing capital values,
home equity protection not only safeguards people’s main financial buffer, but
also offers policy makers an instrument to boost regeneration or prevent decline
in whole neighbourhoods.
Intriguingly, home buyers’ enthusiasm for this idea in our UK example is
muted: just ten (of 35) Boh case study participants reacted positively to this
suggestion. This may be because home prices were buoyant at the time of
the interviews. However, even those acutely aware of their risky dependence
on housing assets were sceptical about the insurance wrapper. Households are
saturated with insurance options, many of which tackle a limited suite of (credit,
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building and contents) risks and are expensive. Housing derivatives enable cost-
effective protection against a wider range of financial risks, and it is interesting
that of the 25 who said they would not entertain this, more than half (14) were
more averse to insurance as a product than to derivatives as a concept: ‘buying
insurances policies is a bit like gambling’; ‘they always find a way of not paying
you’. A few, like this high income ‘general-investor’, also regard insurance as a
poor derivatives deal: ‘you’re hedging against a fall but you don’t get any of the
upside’. The dominant message is that this ‘traditional’ (insurance) style of risk
mitigation might not, in the UK at least, be the most effective means of protecting
the housing assets of those who need them most.
There is an interesting contrast between mortgagors’ views on insurance and
their answer to a question asking whether they would be interested to use more
directly an index of (say) London house prices, to balance the ups and downs of
their own home price. There is a current of enthusiasm for this among three in
five of those we spoke to: ‘it makes sense; it reduces your personal risk’ [Male,
50]. Even those who are cautious agree that ‘in principle it sounds like a good
smoothing mechanism’ [Male, 40]. Some, of course, are less comfortable with
the idea, arguing that the concept is:
Too risky
It’s a gamble, isn’t it? It’s a risk . . . No, I just don’t think I would entertain anything like that at
all. [Female, 42, mid-income, housing investor]
Too much like the stock market
Sounds like shares . . . I wouldn’t touch shares at all to be honest. [Male, 42, low-income,
housing investor]
Not enough like the stock market
we have stocks and shares for that. [Female, 47, mid-income, housing investor, first-time buyer]
Easy to beat the index
If I was going to invest in that then I’d presumably have bought a second home, because I
would feel I am confident enough about my knowledge of prices in different places. [Female,
42, middle-income, housing investor]
Requires too much skill
You’ve really got to be switched on for that . . . you’d really need to know where to invest . . . For
a layman like me I think that I might be out of my depth. [Female, 50, middle-income, housing
investor]
On the whole, however, it is less surprising to learn that people find these
ideas challenging than it is to document their readiness and ability to engage
with such debates at all. They may not like insurance, but could well be
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open to other ways of risk-sharing, perhaps by embedding housing derivatives
into a new generation of price−index-linked mortgages (Liu, 2006; Syz et al.,
2006).
Until recently, the investment component of home ownership has been
neither divisible nor amenable to risk-sharing. Derivatives can alter this, but there
are questions concerning the appropriate ‘delivery’ vehicles. For the most part,
derivatives markets are geared (by virtue of the high value of contracts, and the
skills required to handle them) to those large investors who might later package
options, futures and swaps into mortgages, insurances and investment products,
for the retail market. Some ventures challenge this ‘top–down’ formula, most
notably Hedge Street in the USA (which is the only registered derivatives clearing
organisation in the US catering to very small investors) and the UK spread-betting
companies. Boh (case study) participants talked about this, sometimes giving the
sense that ‘I’d rather have a bet than insurance’. However, the majority – 30/35 –
would not entertain the idea: like most home buyers, they are generally risk
averse; they subscribe to the widely held industry view that ordinary households
should not dabble directly in derivatives.
A combination of mortgagors’ openness to index-based hedging and
investment schemes, and their healthy scepticism to the riskier (spread-betting)
end of this market, suggests that as the trade in housing derivatives trickles down
to individual households, there might be scope – either in commercial retail
products, or via instruments harnessed by governments and housing institutions
in the interests of affordability and sustainability – to implement safely some
of the cost-effective risk management ideas that derivatives now facilitate. In
principle, the risks offloaded onto the lay public in Ulrich Beck’s (1999) vision
of society could be re-acquired, redistributed or repackaged to better meet the
needs of households, or to secure a range of other policy goals.
We have argued before that financial services are bought as often by canny
consumers as by duped debtors (Cook et al., 2006), and that people’s approach to
housing wealth can be as careful as it is competent (Searle et al., 2009; Smith et al.,
2007b). So it is intriguing to note that while very few Boh participants are willing
to borrow against the value of their home to secure the risk-management options
outlined above, there is also a sense that this might be different if it were part of a
more comprehensive risk-sharing enterprise: ‘I would be interested in investing in
some sort of property portfolio investment but with a social purpose.’ According
to this well-off middle-aged housing professional, using MEW to provide for
people in housing need ‘would be justified in sort of moral terms, which would
mean there would be more people to carry the risk. So it would feel right to
me and therefore more attractive’. If national and local governments, social and
other housing institutions were able to engage with such sentiment, it might yet
be possible to use financial markets to meet some key social and housing policy
goals.
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Conclusion
There are two kinds of financial risk associated owner-occupation. Credit risks
refer to those individual, institutional and systemic precursors of mortgage
default which leave vulnerable households open to possession and have a bearing
on the sustainability of owner-occupation, as well as on the stability of whole
economies. The second kind of risk is borne by home-occupiers of all kinds,
and is less widely aired. It stems from the normalisation of a housing-biased
investment portfolio, in settings where prices are volatile, and housing wealth
forms an asset-base for welfare. These risks, which pertain to both inclusion in,
and exclusion from, home ownership, have a bearing on social wellbeing, and
challenge the viability of entire societies.
This article addresses the second theme. We first note the accumulation of
wealth into housing, and document the extent to which home buyers (and their
governments) look to these assets as a financial buffer or safety net. We then
argue that this is a risky strategy not just for owners exposed to price volatility
but also for renters unable to buy into price gains, and for policy-makers looking
to build a sustainable housing system. We point to both an appetite, and a need,
to explore new ways of mitigating these risks, at a time when owner-occupation
is both a housing service and a welfare resource. In particular, we reflect on the
relevance of innovations in financial markets that are specifically designed to
mitigate the systemic risks (and to disperse the skewed financial rewards) built
into ‘home-ownership’ societies. Acknowledging that this is a controversial idea,
we follow Caplin et al. (2003a) in suggesting that while today’s privately owned
housing systems may not be the ideal springboard into a fair, just and inclusive
supply of shelter, it might on balance be better rather than worse if ordinary
households could benefit from the financial instruments that large institutions
already use to manage risks and secure assets.
Concentrating on the equity (rather than debt) side of the equation, we
show that housing derivatives – a new generation of financial engineering –
can be used to tackle two key problems associated with ‘banking on housing’:
the ‘indivisibility’ of housing investments (their over-use by some and their
unavailability to others); and the volatility of home prices. In tackling these
dilemmas, derivatives lay the foundations for a tenure-neutral approach to
housing resources – and to the practicalities of harnessing their financial and
welfare implications. Broadly, our suggestion is that, as it becomes possible to
separate the price dynamics of owned homes from the housing services they
contain, there is a social policy argument as well as an economic imperative
for doing so. Certainly, this is worth debating. The challenge then will be to
determine how best to use the traditions and energies of social policy to engage
with (manage, regulate, perhaps even transform) the world’s financial markets, to
ensure that the housing futures they envisage converge with, rather than diverge
from, the material needs of home-occupiers.
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Notes
1 Any loan which can be ‘borrowed against’ as well as paid off.
2 The merits of presenting numbers and proportions in qualitative research are debatable, but
because the Boh dataset is comparatively large, we regard it as good practice to present the
field of opinion from which quotations are drawn at key junctures in the text.
3 The words of 41 participants are used in all; 11 are cited twice. Quotations are followed
by key qualifiers: first-time buyers are always identified; income bands are low (<£35k),
medium (£35k–£64k), and high (>£64k); unmortgaged housing equity tertiles are low
(<£105), medium (£105k–£169k), and high (>£169k); current loan-to-value is the ratio of
outstanding mortgage debt to estimated home values; gender and age are also listed.
4 There are exceptions at the more adventurous end of the shared equity/housing partnership
spectrum (Caplin et al., 2003a; Whitehead and Yates, 2009).
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